

Living *is* information processing: from molecules to global systems.

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Abstract

We extend the concept that life is an informational phenomenon, at every level of organisation, from molecules to the global ecological system. According to this thesis: (a) living is information processing, in which memory is maintained by both molecular states and ecological states as well as the more obvious nucleic acid coding; (b) this information processing has one overall function - to perpetuate itself; and (c) the processing method is filtration (cognition) of, and synthesis of, information at lower levels to appear at higher levels in complex systems (emergence). We show how information patterns, are united by the creation of mutual context, generating persistent consequences, to result in 'functional information'. This constructive process forms arbitrarily large complexes of information, the combined effects of which include the functions of life. Molecules and simple organisms have already been measured in terms of functional information content; we show how quantification may be extended to each level of organisation up to the ecological. In terms of a computer analogy, life is both the data and the program and its biochemical structure is the way the information is embodied. This idea supports the seamless integration of life at all scales with the physical universe. The innovation reported here is essentially to integrate these ideas, basing information on the 'general definition' of information, rather than simply the statistics of information, thereby explaining how functional information operates throughout life.

Keywords: complex system; entropy; biocomplexity; evolution; network.

21 **1 Introduction: what is life?**

22 The question ‘what is life’ is one of the oldest in philosophy, deeply mysterious and still fascinating. Not
23 only is it fundamental to biology, it has challenged and extended physics, metaphysics, the human sciences
24 of medicine and psychology, the arts and even spiritual thinking. But efforts to answer the question have
25 generally been constrained by disciplinary boundaries or within an organizational scale of life, leading to
26 several apparently separate answers. The aim of this paper is to unite these by considering life as a whole,
27 simultaneously at every organizational level (from molecule to global ecosystem). This integration uses the
28 concept of life as information processing for a unifying principle.

29 During the second half of the 20th century, the paradigm that ‘life is chemistry’ (Kornberg, 1991) was
30 especially influential in understanding living processes at the sub-cellular level. As increasingly compli-
31 cated networks of molecular interactions were recognised, the need for a formal understanding of their
32 organizational structures developed into systems biology, which now extends beyond the cell (Kohl et al.,
33 2010). At the same time, but largely unrelated, theoretical ecology developed into a form of cybernetics: the
34 study of self-regulating systems, moving chemical substances through networks of populations and com-
35 munities. The complex networks of the cell’s biochemistry were paralleled by complex webs of interactions
36 among organisms: the elaborate complexities of the ‘-omics’ were matched by those of biodiversity as we
37 realised that the estimated 15 million species (8.7 million eukaryotic (Mora et al., 2011) plus 6 million
38 prokaryotic (Curtis et al., 2002)) are all connected to one-another in networks of community interactions.
39 Observing that these complex networks may be two manifestations of a common feature of life, we now
40 propose a unifying model in which interactions among molecules, cells, organisms and populations all
41 amount to information processing through a hierarchy of functional networks - molecules in cells, cells in
42 organisms and organisms in communities, which compose the biosphere. This model, which extends recent
43 developments in systems biology (Maus et al., 2011) is intended to integrate through all life over its entire
44 history.

45 Biologists know that information is crucial to life, pointing to its role in DNA for maintaining the design
46 of organisms over repeated generations and an understanding of information in protein structure has a long
47 history (see e.g. Yockey et al., 1958). A cybernetic view goes further to claim that information processing,
48 carried out in the medium of biological chemistry, is what life actually *is*. By information processing we
49 mean any logical combination of information having the result of producing information and we shorten
50 this to ‘computation’. The idea that ‘living is computing’, pioneered by theorists such as Galtin (1972) has
51 been popularised by Bray (1995, 2009), but so far, it has been contained within cellular biochemistry (with

52 computation by neural networks the obvious exception). Our aim is to show how well the whole of life
53 can be viewed in this way as an integrated information processing system: all cells working together. This
54 view seamlessly connects with the concept of information as one of three elemental components of exis-
55 tence (with space/time and matter/energy) which has grown within physics over the past several decades,
56 accompanied by a new philosophical position which places information at the core of determining reality
57 (termed ‘Informational Structural Realism’ by [Floridi \(2003\)](#)). Every aspect of life may be regarded as a
58 product and elaboration of the physical world, clearly made of the same matter and energy, ordered in space
59 and time as is every physical system. What makes life special is not the material brought together to take
60 part in living, it is the functional information that orders matter into physical structures and directs intricate
61 processes into self-maintaining and reproducing complexes. In the information model of life, this definitive
62 process (termed autopoiesis by Maturana and Varela ([1980](#))) consists of a system of structural elements con-
63 tinually replacing themselves to maintain the living system by following a program of instructions that both
64 makes their information-rich structure and is instantiated within it. Significantly, this fundamental feature
65 of life is true at every organizational scale, not only at the cellular level.

66 **2 Information Concepts**

67 According to the ‘diaphoric definition of data’ ([Floridi, 2003, 2005](#)), a binary bit (the unit of information)
68 is a single difference. For example, a digital monochrome image of k -pixels instantiates no more than
69 $k - 1$ differences. When the image carries a meaningful picture, it instantiates fewer than the maximum
70 number of differences, so can be compressed by recording only the differences where black changes to
71 white. The maximally compressed image instantiates $k - n$ bits ($n \geq 1$) and this is termed the Algorithmic
72 Information Content (AIC) ([Chaitin, 1990](#)). The same applies not just to representations, such as images,
73 but to real physical objects: a compressible pattern of differences makes an object what it is. This refers
74 not to a description, but to the physical object itself, giving a definition of physical information as a pattern
75 of difference: the algorithmic information embodied by an object so as to give it form. Information in this
76 sense, selects the elementary particles of the object and specifies the locations of these in space and time
77 (under quantum-theoretic constraints). The minimum description of the object is the AIC embodied in both
78 this physical configuration of particles and the nature of each (Pauli’s exclusion principle ensures these are
79 different). On a technical note, AIC is known not to be strictly computable ([Li and Vitányi, 2008](#)), but
80 an effective substitute is available in the Computable Information Content for empirical studies needing to
81 compute it (see e.g. [Menconi, 2005](#)).

82 For most practical purposes, in describing an object, we would consider higher levels of abstraction,
83 such as a pattern of atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, or components, etc.. Again, for most practical purposes,
84 we are concerned not with the total AIC instantiated in an object, but with the *functional information content*
85 (FIC), which is the part of AIC which can cause a persistent change of information in any part of the system.
86 As an illustration, two seemingly identical metal keys will be different in detail (at the small scale), but may
87 both function to open the same lock: their functional information defines their shape as fitting the lock.
88 This is obviously pertinent to biology through the lock and key analogy of messenger molecules, but also
89 describes functional equivalence among all kinds of biological molecules; among cells of the same type and
90 state in the body; and among organisms of the same function in an ecosystem. FIC can be quantified, as
91 demonstrated at the nucleotide level by [Jiang and Xu \(2010\)](#), who calculated it as the minimal amount of
92 genomic information needed to construct a particular organism. We hope to apply this idea to structures of
93 biological information, other than the genetic.

94 In the field of Biosemiotics, pieces of functional information are regarded as symbols (see [Favareau,](#)
95 [2009](#)), but we wish to focus on the functioning of information, rather than its communication. For this,
96 we take the idea of *function* from [Szostak \(2003\)](#), seeing it as what makes systems, including biological
97 ones, operate, in the sense of an operational explanation of function ([Neander, 2011](#)). The definition of
98 ‘function’ has been debated among philosophers for several decades and deserves some attention here.
99 [Cummins \(1975\)](#) proposed that function is an objective account of the contribution of a system component
100 to the ‘capacity’ of the system. Crucially, for Cummins, the capacity (meaning capability) of a system
101 is explained in terms of the capacities of the components it contains, and how they are organised. This
102 concept explicitly matches the understanding that functional information is to be found in the component
103 parts and the way they are organised into a whole. But it has been criticised, especially for its permitting
104 what appear to be unintended consequences as functions (a frequently cited example being that dirt in a
105 pipe may ‘function’ as a valve ([Griffiths, 1993](#))). One of the solutions to this, at least for organisms, is to
106 recognise that natural selection tends to eliminate potential functions of components if they do not contribute
107 to the biological fitness of the system of which they are a part. This qualification was taken up by [Neander](#)
108 ([1991](#)), by developing a biologically-based etiological theory. Whilst appealing, this cannot be used for all
109 biological systems, such as ecological communities, for which evolution by natural selection has not been
110 established, so to be general, we are forced back to the systemic theories of function. However, Darwin’s
111 theory is a special case of a more general principle of selection in which the attribute of persistence is the
112 superset of biological fitness (e.g. [Kauffman, 1993](#)). Thus we tentatively offer a definition of function that

113 is systemic and in the spirit of established etiological definitions, but not reliant on Darwin's theory. It is
114 that any attribute A of a component C of a system S that causes an effect E such that S persists longer or in
115 a wider range of conditions than without it, is a functional attribute of C. Then the functional information
116 instantiated by C is that which establishes A, leading to the persistence in form of S, hence the persistence
117 of information instantiated by S.

118 Szostak's (2003) mathematically amenable definition allows for a quantification of the effectiveness
119 with which information enables a system to perform non-random actions; at least one of which will be
120 self-replication. From here on, we shall use the general term '*effective information*' for that which causes
121 a persistent change, so has an effect in the wider system and reserve the term '*functional information*' for
122 effective information which plays a role in supporting life. We note that at the specifically nucleotide level,
123 since evolution selects for function, non-functional information will be lost from biological systems over
124 evolutionary time (this was demonstrated by Schneider's (2000) 'evolutionary program'). However, non-
125 functional information is continually introduced by random processes, especially at higher (e.g. ecological)
126 levels, so non-functional 'noise' may be expected and should be discounted in the quantification of FIC.

127 We take as axiomatic that information is instantiated in matter through the particular arrangement of
128 its components in space and time. This arrangement defines a unique relationship among the components,
129 which can only instantiate information if it is stable and therefore persists as a configuration in space over
130 a line in time. When two or more such configurations are brought into association, there is a combined
131 arrangement, which if persistent, also instantiates information: that of both components *plus* that of their
132 association. The Shannon information (Shannon, 1948) of the combined configuration is given by the prod-
133 uct of probabilities of each component configuration (less any mutual information). Thus the 'surprise' in
134 finding this new whole is in general greater than that for each of its component parts. Nested construction of
135 increasingly complicated configurations of matter may proceed this way and thereby constitute an increase
136 in information content in the Shannon sense (Shannon, 1948). Most significantly, when configurations
137 combine into stable forms, they do so by presenting context for one another: the information of each is
138 functional information for the other, enabling greater function than that of the sum of parts.

139 The functional meaning of information was defined conceptually by MacKay (1969) who referred to
140 information as "a distinction that makes a difference" and later Bateson (1972) more famously called in-
141 formation "a difference that makes a difference", this idea was then taken up by Hopfield (1994). In this
142 interpretation, information is defined through its interaction with something (including other information)
143 to create a non-random effect, hence it is context dependent. Bates (2005), quoting earlier works, defines

144 information as: “the pattern of organization of matter and energy”. This definition peculiarly addresses
145 effective information. Patterns of organization are the alternative to randomness: patterns show either order
146 (characterised by symmetry) or complexity (broken symmetry). [Schrödinger \(1944\)](#) realised that symmet-
147 rical order was insufficient to account for the genetic information coding life, concluding that it must be in
148 some aperiodic (non-symmetrical) molecule (well before the discovery of DNA). The required organized
149 aperiodicity is commonly known as ‘complexity’; a defining characteristic of which is a high capacity for
150 effective information. [Adami et al. \(2000\)](#) subsequently showed how all biological systems are complex
151 systems in this scientific sense.

152 These concepts are brought together in Figure 1 which shows three levels of information concept in the
153 formation of life. On level 1, physical information is understood as the result of an improbable (following
154 Shannon’s insight) and persistent configuration of energy and/or matter in space and time. In level 2,
155 effective information is defined through consequence: a contextual relation is made among at least two
156 such configurations (now considered as information and termed ‘infons’). This synthesis through mutual
157 context is exemplified by a lock and key enzyme interaction. Level 3 takes this further to capture the
158 idea that a large number of contextual interactions structure an assembly of infons into a complex system;
159 exemplified by a molecular network inside a cell. Not shown is the hierarchical concept that such systems
160 can be the component parts of super-systems, enabling an unbounded construction of nested complexity,
161 in which information at higher levels, but not present at lower levels, can be defined and measured as
162 emergent ([Gershenson and Fernández, 2012](#)). That is the way life appears under observation, exemplified
163 by the notional hierarchy in figure 2 and table 1.




Figure 1: Three levels of information concept explained in the text: at level 1, information is a pattern of difference; at level 2, information becomes effective through context and at level 3, ‘packages’ of effective information combine, affecting one another to form a complex system that computes.

164 **2.1 Order from disorder: self-assembling structures**

165 According to statistical mechanics, the organization of a system is the result of filtering, i.e. selecting a
166 particular configuration of system component states from all possible configurations and this filtering is
167 equivalent to investing the system with information, in the Shannon sense (Shannon, 1948) of reducing the
168 probability of its configuration. When the resulting organization causes sustainable self-assembly, using
169 active filtration from the wider environment, the system may be said to live.

170 It is most parsimonious to assume that the components of matter needed to constitute living organisms
171 were originally distributed in perfect randomness (disorder). Apparently, life alone creates life, but before
172 it appeared for the first time, individually persistent (non-transitory) stages of ordering among collections
173 of molecular components must have occurred. It is broadly understood that this develops through the spon-
174 taneous emergence of ‘order out of chaos’ (von Foerster, 1960; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Kauffman,
175 1993)—in which chaos then referred to disordered randomness. This natural evolutionary phenomenon,
176 which obeys the second law of thermodynamics, is very general. It amounts to the selection of more stable
177 configurations from a set of random configurations, simply by virtue of their stability conferring greater
178 persistence. Darwin’s evolution by natural selection is a particular instance of this process, which also
179 applies to resonance phenomena and crystal formation.

180 Life orders matter, but differs from a crystal in the following critical respects: (a) life is a dynamic
181 pattern not a static one; (b) it is not regular, but rather is complex, meaning that it cannot be summarized
182 in a short piece of information and (c) it manipulates its environment so as to make its persistence more
183 likely. The vortex (e.g. a whirlpool) is an often cited example of a non-living system which displays some
184 of these properties. It maintains itself as a dynamic pattern of matter, even though its constituent parts are
185 constantly changing: molecules which pass through in a moment are replaced by others, but the pattern and
186 therefore the structure-forming information is maintained. This is an example of a ‘dissipative structure’
187 defined and recognized as self-organizing by Prigogine (1977). By continually exchanging matter and
188 energy with their environment, these dynamic structures are able to continually ‘dissipate’ entropy, with the
189 effect of concentrating information. This information is instantiated in the form of the structure. Crucially
190 the essence of these dissipative systems is organizational information, not substance, and the information
191 they maintain has the special property of being that which is necessary for the self-maintenance.

192 Given the required material components and thermodynamic conditions, we see that information in
193 the form of a pattern in matter can emerge spontaneously and maintain itself as long as these conditions
194 allow. The next step is to ask if it can also create the components and maintain the conditions it needs to

195 do this in a changing environment. If any pattern can achieve that feat, then it will be able to reproduce
196 and ensure its persistence far longer than thermodynamics would otherwise allow. The ability of a system
197 (any arrangement of matter) to remake itself is termed autopoiesis and this has been identified as one of the
198 two necessary capabilities of anything living (Maturana and Varela, 1980). The other is cognition, more
199 precisely, the detection and selection of particular elements from an environment of many random elements,
200 which is a kind of information processing. Bitbol and Luisi (2004) showed that autopoiesis and cognition
201 are separately necessary conditions for life, not inseparably linked as apparently first thought by Maturana
202 and Varela (1980). They illustrated their point with reference to the autopoietic fatty acid cells, which Zepik
203 et al. (2001) showed to achieve reproduction and self-maintenance by homeostatic processes autonomously
204 generated from within. From this work, it became clear that for a system to live, it must have at least the
205 following three properties: autopoiesis, cognition and an unbroken boundary to define its limits (Bitbol and
206 Luisi, 2004); this latter stops the ingredients of life from diffusing apart, rendering life's chemical reactions
207 too rare to work as a whole. In practice, all known living systems are cellular¹ and indeed, the cell tegument
208 has never been broken since the beginning of life—it has only been divided by repeated fission. Division
209 among organisms is just an elaboration of division among cells. In this sense all life from its beginning,
210 is unified as a set of cells, related through replication; all creating order from disorder, by cognition and
211 autopoiesis.

212 The result of this long history of accumulating functional information in a population of diverging cell
213 lines is illustrated in Figure 2 where the major developments are illustrated. By specializing into specific
214 types, cells have found ways to more effectively live: colonies of specialist cells forming into the distinct
215 tissues of separate organisms, organized into ecological communities, interacting, to the point of regulating
216 the earth's geochemistry through a homeostatic network. All of this amounts to information processing—
217 selecting molecules from the environment, ordering matter and controlling flows of matter and energy. The
218 information needed to perform these functions is found distributed among the molecules within every cell:
219 not just in nucleotides, but in all the proteins and messenger molecules, their interactions and locations in
220 space. However, seeing life as a whole in space and time, from the first single cell to all extant life, implies
221 an integrated system, for which hierarchical levels represent merely *observed* abstractions of organisational
222 structure (see Salthe, 1985). Considering the whole living system from notional levels of biochemistry at
223 the bottom to global ecosystem at the top, we may regard all but one of the levels in table 1 to be a model, the
224 single exception being organisation into cells. Hierarchy theory recognises constraints imposed by higher

¹Though some biologists may include viruses.

225 levels on the lower, but also the constraint of possibilities from lower levels upwards. We understand the
226 need for bounded cells as one of those possibility constraints and therefore see cells as the one exception -
227 they are not merely a model level but one in the reality of life's organisation.

228 **2.2 Biological systems as effective information**

229 It is evident that the minimum functional information needed to constitute life is large (the smallest non-
230 virus functional information content calculated so far is $2.86 \cdot 10^6$ bits for *Holarctica* (Jiang and Xu, 2010)).
231 By current consensus, life emerged as an entropy-dissipating pattern which created and maintained a bound-
232 ary through which trapped molecules were able to selectively interact with the wider environment (Mo-
233 rowitz, 1992; Smith and Morowitz, 2004). This cognitively filtering system also reproduced itself by growth
234 and fission and all extant life followed via evolution (Robertson and Joyce, 2010). The resulting proto-cell
235 was a complex dynamic system in which information was held, not just in the component molecules, but
236 also in the interactions among them. These interactions instantiated functional information because the
237 molecules gave context to each other, thereby filtering out specifically functional interactions from the
238 whole range of possibilities.

239 The cytoplasmic contents of cells are spatially structured so that the time and place of interaction is a
240 necessary determinant of their effect. Because molecular components are distributed in a specific spatial
241 pattern, their collective behavior is extended to form regions of coordinated, but different action over space.
242 This instantiates functional information in spatial relations so that simple unitary systems (e.g. enzyme in-
243 teractions) combine to exhibit complex behaviors which *appear* to be the product of more complicated com-
244 ponents. The apparently spontaneous emergence of new information (Gershenson and Fernández, 2012),
245 is in fact the revelation of that spatio-temporal information already present in the distribution of compo-
246 nents and the network of signaling paths among them (a phenomenon first described by Turing, 1952). Any
247 spatio-temporal information (coding the positions of system elements in time and space) that contributes to
248 the emergent behaviors of the whole system, is effective information, and in life this is maintained by au-
249 topoiesis. When a more complicated system is created from simple units in this way, it results in a new unit,
250 the combination of these being the next tier in an hierarchy of complexity. It is by this nested hierarchical
251 construction that the enormously complex machinery of life is brought into being.

252 Information is therefore not just stored in nucleotides: it is the whole biological system that embodies
253 effective information, hence biocomplexity as a whole is the storage of effective information in living na-
254 ture. Valentine (2003a) realised this and emphasised that biological complexity exists as a set of hierarchical

255 levels, as we illustrate in table 1 (adapted from [Farnsworth et al. \(2012\)](#)). Spontaneous creation of effective
256 information from complex order is a signature property of such hierarchies: every level spontaneously
257 *emerges* from the one below ([Adami et al., 2000](#); [Lorenz et al., 2011](#)) - all the way up to global ecosystems.
258 For this reason, even a complete description of genetic information fails to account for the full comple-
259 ment of effective information in life, which is why seed-banks and zoos are no substitute for community
260 conservation, as noted intuitively by [Lee \(2004\)](#) and [Cowling et al. \(2004\)](#). Indeed, ‘living information’ is
261 only fully instantiated in dynamic, active systems capable of flexibly responding to environmental condi-
262 tions. A common example is the gene-regulatory network, which apparently extracts maximum autopoietic
263 complexity by functioning near criticality ([Balleza et al., 2008](#)), where information content is maximised
264 ([Gershenson and Fernández, 2012](#)).

265 **2.3 Quantifying Functional Information**

266 [Farnsworth et al. \(2012\)](#) classified the total information content of any system into two distinct components:
267 $I_{tot} = I_F + I_R$, where I_F is the functional information and I_R is the random information. Each of these
268 terms can be quantified by the Algorithmic Information Content ([Chaitin, 1990](#)) if the term can be isolated.
269 I_F could, in principle, be quantified by the ‘Effective Complexity’ ([Gell-Mann and Lloyd, 1996, 2003](#)),
270 defined as the minimum description length of regularities, but only given prior knowledge about the regu-
271 larities (see [McAllister, 2003](#), for an expansion of this criticism). To describe life as information, we need
272 a way to identify I_F without such prior knowledge, recognising that effect only results from the interaction
273 of information and its context. In the special case of genomes, this is relatively trivial since almost all
274 the information present is functional ([Schneider, 2000](#)). For quantification, [Jiang and Xu \(2010\)](#) defined
275 ‘effective information’ as that part of the genome which is the minimum needed to reconstruct the organ-
276 ism. This meant estimating the functional (coding) fraction of the genome and (manually) compressing it
277 to form the equivalent Algorithmic Information Content. In an application of Boltzmann’s entropy concept
278 at the genetic level, [Szostak \(2003\)](#) defined ‘functional information’, in terms of a gene string, as $-\log_2$
279 of the probability that a random sequence will “encode a molecule with greater than any given degree of
280 function” - in other words a design brief, without implying a designer. In the case of genes, this ‘function’
281 may be thought of as the biochemical activity (for example a digestive enzyme’s catalytic rate) of whatever
282 molecule is produced from reading the nucleotide sequence. This design-brief concept was developed to
283 the ecosystem level of organisation by [Farnsworth et al. \(2012\)](#), who interpreted it as a set of ecological
284 functions and related functioning to the information content of food-web networks.

285 **3 The natural history of information processing**

286 We have argued that life is a dynamic process of filtering and communicating information. The processing
287 of information (computation) occurs in all cases of changing, combining and directing information. Thus
288 computation is a natural, continuous and ubiquitous process (see [Denning \(2007\)](#)). However, it is impor-
289 tant to distinguish between (a) universal computing, which can represent any computation in symbols that
290 may be 'programmed' and (b) fixed computing in which the hardware and software are interdependent,
291 so that only a narrow range of computational tasks may be performed (this point is discussed by [Hopfield](#)
292 [\(1994\)](#)). Life is very much in the latter category (though since the brain is one of its products, this is not
293 universally the case). Complex system computation is now a well established model in behavioral ecol-
294 ogy, describing many aspects of social organization (reviewed by [Camazine et al. 2001](#)). Other kinds of
295 computation performed by life include information replication, ordering and re-ordering of form and cy-
296 bernetic system control, each of which will be briefly illustrated below. In each case, computation occurs
297 on a distributed network ([Gershenson, 2010](#)), rather than through the linear Von-Neumann architecture of
298 the familiar digital computer. Whether looking at molecular networks or ecological communities, we see
299 that natural computation is composed of cybernetic feedback loops arranged functionally so that the system
300 gains in persistence. That these loops exist is not a surprise, since any random interconnection of quantities
301 may contain loops and many physical processes do. As control circuits they may generate positive feedback,
302 often leading to quick destruction, or negative feedback leading to stability, and hence more likely to persist
303 in their changing environment. In fact, since control of this kind enhances persistence, natural selection
304 favours cybernetic systems (with negative feedback) above others and we may find this kind of computa-
305 tion practically inevitable. However, a network solely composed of negative feedback fixes on a particular
306 equilibrium, so may be insufficiently flexible to perform the processes of life ([Kauffman, 1993](#)). Since a
307 mix of positive and negative feedback loops can create a dynamic and adaptable system of 'state-cycles' in
308 the narrow 'critical' regime between catastrophe and order (exemplified by random Boolean networks with
309 high link densities) this has been proposed as an essential feature of living systems by [Kauffman \(1993\)](#)
310 and we now look for evidence of these in significant developments of biological organisation (Figure 2).

311 **3.1 Computing through cell-signaling networks**

312 If living is the self-sustaining *coordination* of chemical reactions, does this suggest a coordinating manager?
313 The nucleus was once thought to be the 'command centre' of the eukaryotic cell, but observations of cells
314 behaving normally for months after enucleation show that the information processing needed for most




Figure 2: Hierarchical self-assembly of complex systems: the increase in computational complexity through the history of life on earth, often associated with a major transition e.g. from prokaryotic to eukaryotic life-forms, or the development of cell-signalling networks or ecological networks. Note that concentric rings indicate expansion of complexity, rather than a chronological sequence: all inner layers exist concurrently at each level.

315 activities is cytoplasmic (Goldman et al., 1973). It would be better to think of the nucleus as the ‘hard
316 disk’ of the cell, since here (for the human) the ‘blueprints’ for at least 47 thousand different proteins
317 (Orchard et al., 2005) are stored and transcribed, together with editable instructions about when to make
318 them. The ‘algorithms of living’ are run on these proteins which act in ways analogous to transistors and
319 other electronic components, in complex networks, as described by Butler et al. (1998).

320 The model of cellular information processing as analogue computation (e.g. Rodbell (1995)) was in-
321 spired by the cybernetic theory of Norbert Wiener (1948). In this model, external chemical messages (first
322 messengers) are first ‘discriminated’ (by the receptor) then ‘transduced’ (by a G protein) and finally ampli-
323 fied (by an effector enzyme) to produce an intracellular signal (the second messenger)—a sequence that can
324 be summarized as perception. This second signal typically initiates a complex sequence of interconnected
325 changes which may alter the internal chemistry of the cell, change the response to other first messengers,
326 and even selectively alter gene expression (Cairns et al., 1988). Such cascades of molecular response form
327 dynamic networks that carry and process information (Lehn, 1990), analogous to artificial neural networks.
328 Chemical switches are implemented by the allostery of proteins, especially enzymes, acting as ‘transis-
329 tors’ in the network circuitry (Bray, 1995). Furthermore, activated proteins do not simply diffuse to collide
330 with their targets. Cytoplasm is a well organized and densely crowded environment in which the reaction
331 cascades are localized by ‘scaffold’ proteins, reminiscent of the electronic circuit board. For example, the
332 protein kinase enzyme, type II PKA may be fixed to either the plasma membrane, the cytoskeleton, secre-
333 tory granules, or the nuclear membrane by anchoring proteins (Scott and Carr, 1992). The effect is not
334 only to position this signaling protein close to its intended target but also to determine the local molecular
335 environment (context) which may profoundly influence the effect. Such protein networks are built and re-
336 paired following the DNA blueprint, which as we have just noted, may itself be altered by the cytoplasmic
337 computation. Thus, proteins dynamically send, receive and respond to informational signals in complex
338 and dynamically changing networks of both negative and positive feedback, which, collectively interacting
339 with stored DNA-information, form the behavior of the cell and this is readily interpreted as molecular
340 computation.

341 **3.2 Replicating information**

342 Biological reproduction is an information transfer (communication) phenomenon, from parent(s) as the
343 transmitter to daughter(s) as the receiver. This biological communication requires a high standard of ac-
344 curacy, since the information being transmitted is very nearly all functional (Schneider, 2000). Given this

345 view of reproduction as efficient semantic communication, it was a surprise to realise that the length of
346 the nuclear genome bears no relation to organism complexity (Gregory, 2001; Valentine, 2003a). Since
347 the complexity of a system can be defined as the minimum amount of information needed to describe (or
348 reproduce) it, one possible reason is that species differ in the amount of error-mitigating repetition their
349 genomes carry. As well as this, the DNA of almost all organisms harbours a zoo of information parasites
350 (selfish DNA - Orgel and Crick (1980)) and their remnants, making up a large part of what was historically
351 referred to as 'junk DNA' when its function was unknown. Transposable elements form the majority of
352 this repetitive information (Wessler, 2006). It is now thought that many of these 'transposons' originated
353 as endogenised retro-viruses (Bowen and Jordan, 2002): parasites that have been co-opted into functional
354 symbiosis under regulation by the host (Veitia and Bottani, 2009). This legacy of non-host information
355 accounts for a large part of the huge variation in genome size among eukaryotes, where multiple copies
356 of information parasites are found. However, the relationship between nuclear genome size and organism
357 complexity is still an open question.

358 Given our understanding of emergence and the formation of functional information from mutual context,
359 we can see that not all of the functional information is to be found in nuclear DNA. So whilst physically,
360 it is the genes that are replicated in biological reproduction, context-dependent relationships among them
361 constitutes functional information that is carried along with the replication. Gene regulatory networks
362 (GRNs) (Davidson and Levin, 2005) are the most significant information complexes to extend beyond
363 nuclear DNA and are composed of context-dependent relationships among infons, rich in both negative
364 and positive feedback. Again, these networks are readily modeled as computational systems (Kravchenko-
365 Balasha et al., 2012) and their role in determining body-plan through epigenetic phenomena points to a
366 possible correlation between GRN complexity (hence information content) and organism complexity.

367 **3.3 The eukaryotic revolution**

368 Following pioneering work by Margulis (1970), endosymbiosis is the front-running theory explaining the
369 origin of eukaryotic cells and this well illustrates the increase of function brought about through the creation
370 of mutual context among infons (level 2 in Figure 1). The advantage of eukarotic cells over prokaryotic
371 is the specialisation of metabolic, anabolic and reproductive machinery. The component parts collectively
372 become more efficient by (a) individually concentrating on a smaller task and (b) sharing the products.
373 The fundamental reason this narrowing of tasks improves effectiveness is that it reduces the information
374 requirement for performing all necessary tasks. If we think of a cell as a machine performing n processes;

375 it needs storage capacity enough to instantiate the algorithms for all n tasks. prokaryotic cells have rather
376 limited storage capacity (determined by their AIC), so cannot afford a very sophisticated algorithm for
377 every task they have to perform - they are limited in effectiveness by their information capacity limit.
378 When a cell incorporates others, it increases its storage capacity and permits a distribution of tasks among
379 specialist components, each of which can devote the whole of their limited storage capacity to carrying a
380 sophisticated and efficient algorithm for a single task. It is also necessary to include the communications
381 and sharing among the specialist components, so some algorithm space is devoted to this. The exchange
382 among individual components forms a network of control computation, which on a larger scale constitutes
383 a complex system (level 3 in Figure 1).

384 **3.4 Cell types and body-plan complexity**

385 Information's role in ordering of form is most apparent in the building of multi-cellular organisms. Cells
386 come in a large variety of forms, with hierarchical morphotype structure and developmental lineages (Valen-
387 tine, 2003a). The number of distinct cell types in a single organism is taken as an indicator of its complex-
388 ity (Carroll, 2001) and varies among metazoan phyla from 3 (Myxozoa) to 210 (human) having steadily
389 increased through evolutionary time (Valentine et al., 1994). This indicates a gradual accumulation of bio-
390 logical complexity, and therefore functional information, as life-forms have radiated and cell specialisation
391 has apparently increased. Despite that, Hinegardner and Engelberg (1983) concluded that "evolution since
392 the Cambrian appears to have involved few major increases in biological complexity", as Valentine (1994)
393 argued, the basic body-plans of all extant phyla were established by the end of the Cambrian explosion (520
394 My ago). The apparent contradiction may be explained by proliferating patterns of gene expression, rather
395 than the creation of new genes; this being one of the central hypotheses of evolutionary development biol-
396 ogy (see Valentine, 2003b). Such proliferation of patterns and the consequent radiation of organism-forms
397 is the result of ordering and re-ordering of functional information. Different cell-types are created by reg-
398 ulating the expression of different genes in the total genome—simpler organisms suppress the expression
399 of a higher proportion of their developmental genes than do complex ones (Davidson, 2001). Thus, the
400 morphological complexity of an organism is determined by the regulatory machinery which selects genetic
401 expression during the development of an organism. The number of cell types is one computed 'output' of
402 gene regulatory networks and gives a very rough indication of functional information content. A trend in
403 modeling body-plan regulatory networks, represents them in a way analogous to artificial neural networks
404 (Geard and Wiles, 2005), clearly interpreting morphogenesis as computation. This suggests a means of

405 quantifying the functional information of body plans by experimentally (*in silico*) examining variants of
406 formative gene-networks and recording the resulting morphometric diversity.

407 **3.5 Cybernetic computation by ecological communities**

408 Darwin's metaphor of a 'tangled bank' suggests a bewildering complex of interactions among whole or-
409 ganisms (Montoya et al., 2006), but natural computation is rarely, if ever, explicit in ecological models.
410 Information processing in ecological communities is less clear than in cells and organisms because ecosys-
411 tems usually lack obvious boundaries and their functions are usually considered, not at the system level, but
412 at the population level, where cybernetic control is not apparent. However, some recent developments pave
413 the way for this to change; both in describing the information content of communities and in understanding
414 them as self-regulating complex systems.

415 The study of biodiversity provides a starting point to finding the functional information content at the
416 ecological level. Using the idea that difference is the basis of information (Floridi, 2005), diversity (which
417 by definition counts total difference) becomes a measure of information content. Traditionally, biodiversity
418 describes the number of different species and perhaps the evenness of their abundances in an ecological
419 assembly, using metrics inspired by Shannon's information theory (see Magurran, 2004). More recently,
420 broader definitions recognize diversity at every level in the biological hierarchy (table 1), and ecologists may
421 now refer to genetic and functional diversity as equally necessary for specifying biodiversity (Lyashevskaya
422 and Farnsworth, 2012). Ecological communities can be regarded as the vaults of information capital, in the
423 form of molecular structures; networks and pathways; cell types; tissues and organs, whole organisms and
424 community interactions (Farnsworth et al., 2012). However, ecologists still refer to organizational scale
425 through informal terms: for example 'alpha' and 'beta' diversity, which are arbitrarily defined phenomena
426 of classification (Tuomisto, 2010) over probability distributions (McGill, 2011; Nekola and White, 1999).
427 Whilst hierarchical nesting of complex systems is explicitly recognised by multi-level modelling in sub-
428 cellular biology, the strength of formal description this provides has yet to enter ecology (see Faeder, 2011).

429 Descriptive approaches can be developed into conceptual models by changing the focus towards the
430 network through which organisms interact (as in Norton and Ulanowicz, 1992). The basic components for
431 such models are available in the special case of predator-prey interactions (e.g. Dunne et al., 2002) (though
432 models of other material and informational – e.g. genetic – flows are less well developed). Given a network
433 description such as a food-web, Farnsworth et al. (2012) showed how the functional information approach
434 may be applied at the ecological level. They systematically dismantled a network model of the Northeast

435 Atlantic fish community, at each stage measuring its productivity, to find a relationship between complexity
436 and function, which provided a measure of the marginal change in function with network (algorithmic)
437 information content. Food-webs are but a partial description of ecosystems, which necessarily include
438 chemical, energy and information flows. Being relatively simpler, microbial networks are more amenable
439 to this fuller description. The recent development of functional and genetic network models in microbial
440 ecology (e.g. [Zhou et al., 2010](#)) gives us a stepping stone between sub-cellular networks and community
441 level computation. Significantly, microbial colonies preceded the close association of eukaryotic cells to
442 form multi-cellular organisms [Lepot et al. \(2008\)](#), yet specialisations among microbe species imply the
443 same need for self-regulating interactions as is found in organismal physiology. By definition, an isolated
444 microbial community must be autopoietic and as specialisation among constituent species develops, so must
445 flows of coordinating information work to compute the community, via complex-system emergence.

446 **3.6 Information processing as an integrated whole.**

447 The computation performed by ecological networks is both broader and narrower than that of a Turing ma-
448 chine (a system following a sequence of logical operations defined by [Turing, 1936](#)). It is broader because
449 inputs are processed continuously, the outputs are produced continuously and because processing is sen-
450 sitive to the environment (in a Turing machine, processing is blind to all but the initial inputs until a halt
451 condition is reached, releasing the output). It is narrower because the computation is equivalent to running
452 a particular model: a model of the system under control, following the injunction of [Conant and Ashby](#)
453 [\(1970\)](#), that “Every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system”. Interactions between the
454 biotic and abiotic spheres of the ecosystem are regulated by controls on chemical flows, driven by the pro-
455 cessing of materials by life *in aggregate*: the sum of individual selection and processing actions amounts
456 to a regulation of the whole ecosystem. Including the flows of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus
457 in ecological network analysis (e.g. [Ulanowicz and Baird, 1999](#)) takes us a step closer to the biochemical
458 analogy of within-cell computation ([Ulanowicz, 1980](#)). Since molecules continually flow through ecosys-
459 tems, just as they do in the cell, we can identify the process of constant renewal of ecosystem structure (the
460 network) as autopoiesis, this time referring to all life in aggregate. The phenomenon of constant renewal by
461 recycling material, driven by transforming high to low entropy energy, accumulated over all life on earth,
462 is the foundation of the Gaia hypothesis ([Lovelock and Margulis, 1974](#)). The total of global ecological
463 processes may be interpreted as a network computer, whose input is the physical and chemical environment
464 of the planet and the output is a computed adjustment of these to maintain equilibrium. Seen this way,

465 life is a computer running a model of itself in order to control its interior state so as to perpetuate itself in
466 a changeable environment. This view, which goes beyond cybernetic self-regulation to reveal autopoietic
467 computation, is closely allied to a growing thermodynamic understanding of living processes in which en-
468 ergy accountancy is integrated with informational interpretations (e.g. in [Smith, 2008](#)). For example, the
469 accumulation of hierarchical complexity, so characteristic of life, has been demonstrated to follow from
470 thermodynamic efficiency ([Wicken, 1979](#); [Annala and Annala, 2008](#); [Annala and Kuismanen, 2009](#)) as has
471 the tendency for hierarchical complex structures to regulate their internal and external environments through
472 information processing ([Kaila and Annala, 2008](#); [Karnani and Annala, 2009](#)).

473 **4 Implications**

474 The information perspective shows life to be (a) continuous with the abiotic universe and (b) the conse-
475 quence of a spontaneous increase in complexity through repeated combination of formative patterns such
476 that they give context and thence function to one-another. Chemistry is the result of this process at the
477 atomic scale and life is a branch of chemistry that is especially rich in opportunities for functional combi-
478 nations. The processes of life are chemical processes, so our ‘life is information’ remains compatible with
479 Kornberg’s ‘life is chemistry’, but goes deeper by highlighting the informational basis of the chemistry of
480 life. Our perspective also emphasises the idea that the whole of life at all scales has a role in reproducing
481 life. Considering life as information processing (computation) where the subject of computation is life, we
482 are faced with a ‘program’ running on itself, the function of which is to output itself. Such recursion is
483 familiar and much exploited in computer science. It highlights the fact that for life, there is no distinction
484 between the ‘machine’ and the program - both are information; they are the same information, ordering
485 and re-ordering matter and energy so as to persist. It would not be right to think of life as a biochemical
486 structure on which a program is run, because life is the program and the biochemical structure is its embod-
487 iment. This is why we say that information is not just in DNA, but is in the whole biological system. The
488 idea that ‘life is information processing’ brings reductionists and synthesists closer together as it shows life
489 to supervene on chemistry strictly according to information content, but to also possess strictly emergent
490 properties (at several levels) arising from the *functions* of the embodied information. Now that functional
491 information content can be quantified at every level of life, we anticipate its use in further deepening our
492 understanding of life and its place in the physical universe.

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Organization Level	Interactions
life as a whole	global bio-geochemical networks
ecological communities	interspecific material and energy flows
populations - species	gene-flow, dispersal, evolution
multi-cellular organisms	organism societies + interspecific, e.g. parasitism
tissues, organs and organ systems	cellular communication and organ function
cells	specialisation and ontogeny: e.g. immune system
sub-cellular structures	catabolic autopoietic processes
molecular networks	metabolic and information processing
DNA sequences: codons to genes	coding and expression control
molecular surfaces	lock and key - enzymes

Table 1: A ten-level hierarchy of biocomplexity. Left column names the level of organization and right column gives examples of the complex interactions and processes that take place at that level, contributing to biocomplexity. Complexity is also added by interactions among levels, both upwards and downwards, producing feedback circuits. Interactions at every level and among levels constitute information processing. (adapted from [Farnsworth et al. \(2012\)](#))